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RETHINKING PATENTS WITHIN
THE NATURAL LAW
Nicholas A. D’Andrea*
INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2019, Senators Thom Tillis and Chris Coons
introduced draft text for legislation that would reform a hotly
contested area of patent law: 35 U.S.C. § 101.1 Reactions to the
proposed legislation drew mixed support from intellectual property
stakeholders.2 However, most of the commentary on the draft text
largely lacked any analysis of the proposed additions to § 100,3 which
read: “The term ‘useful’ means any invention or discovery that
provides specific and practical utility in any field of technology
through human intervention.”4
This addition of “human intervention” seems like an unassuming
proposal. However, even though it may not have been intended, this
concept may provide an opportunity for understanding patent law
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2023; Bachelor of Science in
Mechanical Engineering, North Carolina State University, 2017. Thank you to all the
professors, mentors, peers, and family who always patiently listen to and challenge my ideas,
no matter how off-the-wall they are. Special appreciation is owed to Prof. Sean Seymore for
his mentorship, feedback, and ever-optimistic encouragement on this Note. Lastly, to the
editors of the Notre Dame Law Review, I express my deepest gratitude for your time, effort,
and care in editing and for the comradery and friendships that have inspired me to be a
better person and a different kind of lawyer. All errors are my own.
1 Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Draft
Bill Text to Reform Section 101 of the Patent Act, THOM TILLIS: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C. (May 22,
2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2019/5/sens-tillis-and-coons-and-reps-collins-johnsonand-stivers-release-draft-bill-text-to-reform-section-101-of-the-patent-act
[https://
perma.cc/2FV9-DL26].
2 See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Big Tech’s Opposition to Section 101 Reform: Policy Rhetoric
Versus Economic Reality, HUDSON INST. (June 22, 2020), https://www.hudson.org/research
/16172-big-tech-s-opposition-to-section-101-reform-policy-rhetoric-versus-economic-reality
[https://perma.cc/B4YV-UCTK]; Eileen McDermott, Draft Text of Proposed New Section 101
Reflects Patent Owner Input, IP WATCHDOG (May 22, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com
/2019/05/22/draft-text-proposed-new-section-101-reflects-patent-owner-input/id=109498
/ [https://perma.cc/DG8T-BSCX].
3 See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 2.
4 THOM TILLIS: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C., supra note 1.

2169

2170

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

through a natural law jurisprudence. Patent law is traditionally understood through a purely statutory lens. Indeed, patent law in the United
States is established by the Constitution5 and governed completely by
Chapter 35 of the United States Code. However, I argue in this Note
that the principles of natural law, including the concepts of order and
morality inherent in the natural world, are ripe for application to
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence under Chapter 35, Section 101
(“Section 101”). Specifically, I contend that granting patent rights
under the rationale that these rights foster economic innovation severs
patent law from the concepts of justice inherent in private property
rights and the natural law.
Before approaching patent law, it is important to understand the
natural law and its relationship to private property. Thomas Aquinas
states that private property is not contrary to the natural law, but
“because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law,
but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive
law,” these divisions are “necessary to human life.”6 He outlines the
common benefit of allowing private property rights: “The . . . thing
that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. On
this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but
as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their
need.”7
Such a communal-based framework is key to an understanding of
the necessity for strong patent rights in the modern age. Supreme
Court precedent since Mayo v. Prometheus Laboratories8 and Alice v. CLS
Bank9 has established significant hurdles between software inventors
and patents on their inventions. Alice notably changed a historically
low bar for patent eligibility under Section 101. Section 101 states:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”10
This section appears facially broad. But Justice Thomas, writing
for a unanimous Court in 2014, held in Alice that a computer
implementation of an abstract concept is not an “inventive concept”
sufficient to “‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II Q. 66 art. 2 (Fathers of the Eng.
Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920), https://www.newadvent.org/summa.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
8 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
9 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
10 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
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eligible application.”11 This focus of on transformation of an abstract
idea into something patent eligible, however, is a step beyond the
purpose behind Section 101, which is to determine what things are
patentable inventions versus what are not (i.e., subject matter
eligibility). I argue in this Note that when viewed through the lens of
natural law and private property rights, the subject matter eligibility
analysis should consider the fact that inventions benefit the common
good, and thus they warrant exclusive property rights. I further
consider evidence of historical precedent for this view, but argue that
this focus has since been lost. But a recognition of certain natural law
principles in future patent law legislation may assist in the recognition
of property rights that are due inventors.
Though one scholar has directly suggested an implementation of
Thomas Aquinas’s natural law concepts to United States patent law, 12
that proposal has not been analyzed in light of modern patent law
subject matter eligibility jurisprudence. In Part I of this Note, I trace
the origins of natural law and natural rights in patents through English
and United States legal history. In Part II, I outline the philosophical
principles of natural law and natural rights necessary for understanding patent law. In Part III, I highlight the deemphasis of property
rights in patent law, including in cases such as Alice and Oil States,13 and
propose that that subject matter eligibility should be reoriented by a
legislative fix that emphasizes “human intervention.”
I.

THE ORIGIN OF PATENT LAW RIGHTS

A. Detecting the Natural Law in Early Patent Common Law
Since ratification, the United States Constitution has provided a
limited right to inventions.14 However, comparatively little has been
written on the history of its inclusion.15 According to one commentator, “[t]he reason for the dearth of commentary undoubtedly is that
11 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 80); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin,
Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015) (outlining the jurisprudential
history of “inventive application” and “inventive concept”).
12 See Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. Patent
System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561 (2003).
13 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533 (1870)) (claiming that
“patents are ‘public franchises’”).
14 Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1–2 (1994).
15 Id. at 26.
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so little is actually known about how its inclusion came about.”16 The
inclusion seems to have derived at least in part from a desire to follow
the English system of granting exclusive rights to inventors.17 The
origin of this English legal protection, however, has a fascinating and
contentious history.
Patents, or “letters patent,” were provided by the Crown as a tool
of furthering royal policies.18 Letters patents were granted to
individuals in a particular industry to provide a de facto monopoly on
a particular area of trade.19 These grants began initially as privileges
granted by the Crown over particular methods of trade.20 The grants
included, for example, the right to hold a fair or a market or the right
to charge for goods passing through a town.21 The Crown, over a time
period between the 1500s and 1600s, subsequently expanded these
privileges to selling rights.22 For example, the Crown may have granted
an individual the exclusive right to sell goods such as salt or leather
within a geographic area.23 While the first monopolies over trade were
relatively uncontroversial, the resulting expansion drew critics.24 This
criticism came to a head thanks to Sir Edward Coke.
Coke strongly held the belief that the common law prohibited
monopolies.25 In his report of the case Darcy v. Allen, known as the
Case of Monopolies, Coke highlights how the court found that
monopolies were against statutes and the common law.26 Though
there was no written opinion issued by the court there, Coke

16 Id.
17 Id. at 34 (explaining that the inclusion “seems to have been predicated on their
desire to follow the English practice of granting exclusive rights through the issuance of
patents or a similar device”).
18 Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001).
19 See id. at 1259–60.
20 Id. at 1259.
21 F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 260 (1st ed. 1908).
22 Id. at 260–61.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 261.
25 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
355, 356 (1954). Coke may have been mistaken or guided by extralegal motivations in
arriving at this conclusion, but his opinions influenced the development of anti-monopoly
law in England. Id. at 362, 365–66.
26 See The Case of Monopolies (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265–66; 11 Co. Rep. 84 b,
88 a–b. Notably, reporters differ on the spelling of the plaintiff’s name (and Coke is the
only one to refer to the case as “The Case of Monopolies”). See Oren Bracha, The
Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 195 n.93 (2004). For consistency, I will use the “Allen” spelling in
the text of this Note.
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represented Darcy (and the Queen) as Attorney General. His reports
include indications of arguments reportedly well-received by the
jurists.27 Darcy had been granted by the Queen an exclusive license
over the import and sale of playing cards.28 The grant, the justices
reasoned, was contrary to the common law for being contrary to the
restriction of trade.29
How does this common-law prohibition on letters patent relate to
the natural law? Sir William Blackstone, documenter of the common
law, believed that “natural law imposed basic duties to God, to oneself
and to one’s neighbor and that municipal law added further duties of
citizenship.”30 These concepts of the common good in the natural law
were generally only applied directly in cases when the common law was
silent.31 In the case of Darcy, the reports indicate that the court relied
on both cases and statutes to support its rationale.32 But reference to
the common good was not left out. Specifically, one report stated:
“The ordinance of God is, that every man should live by labour, and
that he that will not labour, let him not eat.”33 Further, “that for the
good of the realm: that in such cases the King may grant to him a
monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may
learn the same, in consideration of the good that he doth bring by his
invention to the commonwealth: otherwise not.”34 Coke’s reports
likewise indicate that the justices believed that restriction of trade in
part “agrees with the equity of the law of God,” since it “tends to the
impoverishment of divers artificers and others, who before, by the
labour of their hands in their art or trade, had maintained themselves
and their families, who now will of necessity be constrained to live in

27 Bracha, supra note 26, at 195 n.93 (“[W]hatever the judicial reasons were as
reported, Darcy v. Allen remains an important landmark. . . . [R]eports of the case reveal
the way emerging common law thought about monopolies was synthesized and presented
by a host of important and influential reporters who published their accounts years after
the decision.”).
28 The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1260–61, 11 Co. Rep. at 84 b–85 a.
29 See id. at 1260, 11 Co. Rep. at 84 b.
30 Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996).
31 Michael Lobban, The Common Law Mind in the Age of Sir Edward Coke, 2001 AMICUS
CURIAE, 18, 19 (“Coke himself cited natural law as a basis of argument in Calvin’s Case[,] . . .
stating that it was the eternal law infused into the heart of man at the time of his creation,
and declaring that it existed before any municipal or judicial laws. However, Coke was using
the principle to answer a question for which there was no clear solution in the common
law . . . .”).
32 Darcy v. Allin (1602) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1136, 1140 (KB).
33 Id. at 1137.
34 Id. at 1139.
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idleness and beggary.”35 Thus, the grant of monopolies were contrary
to the natural law.
Though monopolies (i.e., “letters patents”) were found contrary
to natural law, however, patents on inventions were explicitly legally
exempted from this prohibition. Even the counsel for Allen
specifically acknowledged that, despite any common-law prohibition
on granting patents generally, the Crown had the ability to grant
patents for inventions.36 The Darcy court agreed, and indicated that
articles of invention were excluded from the illegal grant of
monopolies: “[A]ll monopolies, grants, letters patent, and licenses, for
the sole buying, selling, and making of goods and manufactures, are
declared void, except . . . this does not extend to . . . inventors of new
manufactures.”37
Considering which side of the “v” Coke represented in Darcy, it is
somewhat ironic that he eventually drafted and introduced the Statute
of Monopolies in parliament some 20 years later, which effectively
solidified the ban of monopolies in England.38 There, however,
patents on inventions were again protected by parliament. When it
was passed, an explicit exemption was carved out for inventors:
“Provided nevertheless . . . [the Statute] shall not extend to any letters
patents and grants of privilege for . . . the sole working or making of
any manner of new manufacture within this realm, to the first and true
inventor or inventors of such manufactures.”39 Though there is a
contemporaneous debate over whether patent rights are considered
monopoly rights,40 language in the current United States patent statute
mirrors the Statute of Monopolies’s language: “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, . . . or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor . . . .”41

35 The Case of Monopolies (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263; 11 Co. Rep. 84 b, 86 b.
36 Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J.
1261, 1304 (1996).
37 The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1262 n.D, 11 Co. Rep. at 86 a; see also Darcy,
74 Eng. Rep. at 1139.
38 See Barbara Malament, The “Economic Liberalism” of Sir Edward Coke, 76 YALE L.J.
1321, 1351 (1967); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 995 (stating that
Coke’s view of the royal patent power may have changed or may have no longer been as
controversial as it once had been).
39 JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, A COMPENDIUM OF MERCANTILE LAW app. 21 Jac. 1. c. 3, at i
(George Morley Dowdeswell ed., 4th ed. 1848).
40 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
59 (8th ed. 2021).
41 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
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B. U.S. Patent Rights and the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause
United States patent law has roots in English law that are both
statutory and, to some extent, reflective of the natural law. However,
before analyzing how English precedent connects to modern
American jurisprudence, it is important to identify current rationales
behind an alleged natural right to patents. Professor Mossoff, for
example, argues that Lockean Labor Theory has played more into the
grant of patents than popularly acknowledged.42 He argues that there
was a preexisting natural right to inventions that predated the Statute
of Monopolies. When Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies,
“it created a civil right of patents for inventions . . . [which]
transformed this natural right into a legal right.”43 Nevertheless,
turning to the United States, whether or not modern patent rights are
derived from English statutory or common law, any underlying
common law rights are not per se overruled.44
Natural exclusive rights to invention, however, were likely not on
the minds of the Founders when they drafted the Constitution and its
Intellectual Property Clause. Likely, the purpose in including the
Intellectual Property Clause was (1) to provide a cohesive structure to
patent rights across the Union45 and (2) to remove any question about
Congress’s power to grant patents.46 Both goals may have been influenced by the additional intent of decreasing costs in administration of
a patent system. That proposition is somewhat supported by the fact

42 Mossoff, supra note 18, at 1313–14 (pointing to an 1803 English decision that
appears to stand for the proposition that “[i]f the patented invention is ‘essentially new’
and ‘productive,’ then the inventor has engaged in the appropriate labor that justifies his
moral claim to his patent right, i.e., he ought to have his fourteen-year patent”).
43 Id. at 1300. Additionally, for commentary on the relationship between the common
law and the Statute of Monopolies, see W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
RELATIVE TO PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 3 (1847) (“It is quite
certain that in England the Crown derives its power to grant such letters patent from the
Common Law itself, but restrained by the Statute of Monopolies, which was little more than
a declaration of the Common Law on the subject.”). See also id. (“[I]nventors are never
entitled as of right to letters patent . . . but they must obtain them from the Crown by petition,
and as a matter of grace and favour . . . .”).
44 See Adam J. MacLeod, Public Rights After Oil States Energy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1281, 1312 (2020) (arguing that historically, merely because a statute was passed does not
eliminate prior rights, since “both unwritten common law and written legislation specify
the general requirements of the law of reason”).
45 See Walterscheid, supra note 14, at 22 (“[S]tates only could legislate with respect to
their own territory. Thus, state patents and copyrights could be infringed with impunity in
adjoining states.”).
46 Id. at 34 (“[T]he delegates were not at all certain that the Congress would have the
power to do so without an explicit grant of authority.”).
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that it is the only constitutional clause which requires a specific method
of protecting a defined right (i.e., requiring a limited term).47
Nevertheless, a view of natural rights to patents likewise seemed
to take hold by legal practitioners in the United States. For example,
in a seminal patent case in 1852, the great Daniel Webster gave an
opening argument, worthy of lengthy reproduction here, in which he
argued:
The Constitution does not attempt to give an inventor a right to his
invention, or to an author a right to his literary productions. No
such thing. But the Constitution recognizes an original, pre-existing,
inherent right of property in the invention, and authorizes
Congress to secure to inventors the enjoyment of that right. But
the right existed before the Constitution and above the
Constitution, and is, as a natural right, more clear than that which
a man can assert in almost any other kind of property. What a man
earns by thought, study and care, is as much his own, as what he
obtains by his hands. It is said that, by the natural law, the son has
no right to inherit the estate of his father—or to take it by devise.
But the natural law gives man a right to his own acquisitions, as in
the case of securing a quadruped, a bird, or a fish by his skill,
industry, or perseverance. Invention, as a right of property, stands
higher than inheritance or devise, because it is personal earning. It
is more like acquisitions by the original right of nature. In all these
there is an effort of mind as well as muscular strength. 48

Webster’s words reflect a clear, natural law view of intellectual
property.
Having established the hints of natural law within the historical
origins of the patent system, the next question is how natural law
philosophy should influence patent law. There is notably some debate
over the relationship between natural law and natural rights, which I
don’t hope to settle in the context of patent law. Instead, I attempt
focus on the natural law itself, and why this philosophy is a preferable
approach to assessing when a patent should be granted.
II.

NATURAL LAW, PROPERTY, AND PATENTS

There is an academic and philosophical disagreement over the
relationship between natural law and natural rights. Do natural rights

47
48

See id. at 33.
DANIEL WEBSTER, SPEECH OF THE HON. DANIEL WEBSTER, IN THE GREAT INDIA
RUBBER SUIT 1–2 (Arthur & Burnet 1852).
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stem from natural law?49 Do natural rights give rise to natural law?50
Or are these concepts completely separate?51 Without attempting to
solve these difficult questions, I instead attempt to posit that—whether
or not there is a natural right to protection of inventions—a robust
system of ensuring protection of inventions is beneficial to the
common good of the natural law as approached by Thomas Aquinas.
A. Natural Law and Property Rights
According to Aquinas, law is divided into four categories: (1)
divine law, (2) eternal law, (3) natural law, and (4) human law.52
Natural law is the law that refers to the nature of man and is manifested
“in the inclinations of a man’s nature and to nothing else.”53 While
human law may be established by a government, this law, in Thomas’s
view, cannot be at odds with the natural law.54
Thomas Aquinas states that private property is not contrary to the
natural law, but “because the division of possessions is not according
to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which
belongs to positive law,” these divisions are “necessary to human life.”55
He indicates the common benefit of allowing private property rights:
“The . . . thing that is competent to man with regard to external things
is their use. On this respect man ought to possess external things, not
as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them
to others in their need.”56
It is this nature of the use of the goods that Thomas indicates is
essential to his definition of private property. The philosopher Jacques
Maritain argues that while Thomistic “use” requires that private
possession be for the benefit of the common good (i.e., possession
cannot be for purely selfish reasons),57 “use” necessarily requires

49 See Brian Tierney, Natural Law and Natural Rights Old Problems and Recent Approaches,
64 REV. POL. 389, 390 (2002) (describing John Finnis’s philosophy).
50 See id. (describing Norberto Bobbio’s philosophy on Hobbes)
51 Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor’s Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 655, 680–81 (1997).
52 See Lim, supra note 12, at 587–88.
53 Thomas E. Davitt, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law, in ORIGINS OF THE
NATURAL LAW TRADITION 26, 39 (Arthur L. Harding ed., 1954).
54 See Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, in 11 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JACQUES MARITAIN 1, 102 (Otto Bird ed., Otto Bird, Joseph Evans & Richard O’Sullivan
trans., 1996) (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II Q. 95 art. 2).
55 AQUINAS, supra note 6, at III Q. 66 art. 2.
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 Maritain, supra note 54, at 108.
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personal domain (i.e. ownership), over “material and . . . the means
necessary for executing” one’s work.58
According to Maritain’s interpretation of Thomas, the two
concepts of private property consider a “person as intellectual maker”
and a “person as moral agent.”59 The person as intellectual maker is
one who creates things, and that person must have ownership over the
means of producing those created things for the common good.60 The
person as moral agent is one who is obligated to use those things for
the common good.61 Thus, Maritain states, “the artistic and productive
work of man is the outcome of personal activity . . . . [T]he material
that is to be wrought needs to be the property of him who works on it,
of the person who operates on it—a rational being which is individual
and which has an individual perfection.”62
In other words, makers of things (or inventors) are due private
property rights; yet makers have moral duties to use these objects for
the common good. Unlike private property under Lockean Labor
Theory, where one has a natural right in property because of the labor
he has exerted, Thomistic private property (in Maritain’s view) is based
in the “exercise of art or work,” since it “presupposes the rational
nature and personality of the artist or workman.”63 Contrastingly, for
example, a bee has no private property right to its honey, since the bee
is not capable of human reason.64 Maritain explains, “[t]he
metaphysical foundation of private property has thus to do with the
artistic side of human nature.”65 This artistic side of human nature
implies private property, since “[t]he vocation of human nature to
elaborate raw material according to a rational design requires
generally that external things on which and by which this elaboration
is wrought should be possessed as of right by the person whose rational
activity is in operation.”66
Other modern natural law scholars approach private property
with a similar take. John Finnis, for example, states that private
property arises out of the common good realized through “coordinated ensemble of conditions for individual well-being in [the]

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 104.
Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted).
See id.
See id. at 103, 106.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id.
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community.”67 Rights of exclusion in property are justified because it
enables individuals to promote the common good:
[T]o give private owners freedom to expend their own creativity,
inventiveness, and undeflected care and attention upon the
thing(s) in question, to give them security in enjoying the thing(s)
or investing or developing them, and to afford the owners the
opportunity of exchanging their thing(s) for some alternative
item(s) of property seeming to them more suitable to their lifeplans.68

Notably, Finnis’s theory of justice in private property addresses the
problem of distribution of resources within society. According to
Finnis, there are two kinds of resources: (1) subject matter not created
by anybody and (2) common subject matter arising “out of the
willingness of individuals to collaborate to improve their position.”69
For the first, Finnis provides the examples of solar energy, light, and
the sea. For the second, he provides examples of coordinated efforts
for improving society, including a division of labor and the products
that result from that coordination (e.g., weapons, a sea wall, or a
drainage system).70
Drawing on Aquinas, Finnis—like Maritain—argues that an owner
has the duty to use these distributed resources to put it to productive
use.71 Furthermore, it may be up to the state to ensure that this
coordination of property is just, while still requiring individuals to
exercise their corollary duties arising from the private property
ownership: “Where owners will not perform these duties, or cannot
effectively co-ordinate their respective efforts to perform them, then
public authority may rightly help them to perform their duties by
devising and implementing schemes of distribution . . . .”72
B. Natural Law and Patent Rights
There is naturally a direct connection between both Finnis and
Maritain’s view of private property and inventions. For example,
language in Darcy draws direct parallels to both the person as the
intellectual maker and the person as the moral agent: First, Darcy
67 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166 (2d ed. 2011).
68 Id. at 172.
69 Id. at 167.
70 Id. This dichotomy between things not created by anybody and things used to
benefit the community has parallels to certain judicial exceptions in patentable subject
matter eligibility (such as unpatentable laws of nature or abstract ideas), discussed infra in
Section III.A.
71 See FINNIS, supra note 67, at 171–72.
72 Id. at 173.
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reads, “[t]he ordinance of God is, that every man should live by labour,
and that he that will not labour, let him not eat.”73 Second, it recites
that patents on inventions are reasonable “for the good of the realm.”74
Darcy’s reference to “labour” is a reference to the inventive process.
According to Darcy then, inventors are not excluded from a moral
obligation to labor for the benefit of the common good.
Patents, of course, are based on utility.75 Assuming that this utility
should be used for the common good only satisfies Maritain’s moral
agent prong. For patents to be justifiably within one’s personal
domain, they must also be a means of production to the intellectual
maker. At first, it may seem that patents do not assist in production.
They are, in fact, a right to exclude and not a physical tool for
producing items. Exclusivity, however, does itself assist production.
Exclusive rights ensure a business is able to compete on the market
and continue to provide goods and services to the community. This
can be true in a number of ways.
First, exclusivity may be justified as a tool against barriers to entry.
Consider the case of Stuart Anders, inventor of the 1990s fad the Slap
Wrap.76 Anders was a Midwesterner and former Army helicopter
pilot.77 When he brought his invention to the Toy Fair trade show in
1990, everyone was talking about it—and free samples were slapped on
every attendee.78 Within a short time period, Anders had major orders
from major toy companies.79
Shortly, Anders’s invention was
everywhere—but they weren’t his products, they were knockoffs.80 The
Slap Wrap was not patented.81 In the time after the Toy Fair and before
Anders could manufacture his product, larger, more agile companies
were able to quickly retool and begin manufacturing Slap Wrap
knockoffs faster than Anders was able.82 In the end, for one of the most

73 Darcy v. Allin (1602) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1137 (KB).
74 Id. at 1139.
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (allowing patents for “any new and useful process”
(emphasis added)); see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966)) (“The threshold of utility
is not high: An invention is ‘useful’ under section 101 if it is capable of providing some
identifiable benefit.”).
76 See StartUp, You Have to Invent Something, GIMLET (Apr. 14, 2017), https://
gimletmedia.com/shows/startup/llhejv [https://perma.cc/R8XX-5GGT].
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See id.
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iconic inventions of the 1990s, Anders wound up with nothing.83 This
is not an uncommon story. Many smaller companies with less ability
to match the resources of larger entities are being “scooped” in the
marketplace.84 In essence, today’s small-town inventors cannot bring
their products of labor to market, since they cannot compete against
the resources of large companies. Patents provide a counter
mechanism to this competition—essentially, exclusivity has become
crucial for operating in many industries.85 If exclusivity is necessary for
a business to operate, then patents are therefore tools of labor (i.e.,
tools of exclusivity) that invoke property rights: they are thus Maritain’s
“material that is to be wrought.”86
Second, due to the unique nature of inventions, exclusivity may
be essential to providing this good to the public. Take the hypothetical
of a logging company. Multiple entrepreneurs may each simultaneously start a logging company. But they will not be competing over a
specific tree; they will be competing over the limited resource of tress
as a whole. An invention, however, is unique by definition. Two
competitors may come upon the same technological improvement, but
it is still the same invention and exact same resource.87 Exclusivity is
necessary in order to bring the product to market. For example, the
Slap Wrap was a single invention. Stuart Anders’s labor (his business)
was predicated on the manufacture of this product. Unfortunately,
without patent protection, he was unable to compete in the market in
the way he would have if he had held the proper means of production
in a patent grant.88
Does this therefore imply that—for the common good—one has
a moral obligation to not copy another’s product, even if it is not
patented? Not necessarily. If there were no system of patent protection available, that may be the case. However, because private property
is rooted in the common good, and because Stuart did not seek patent
83 See id.
84 See, e.g., Leah Nylen & Cristiano Lima, Big Tech’s ‘Bully’ Tactics Stifle Competition,
Smaller Rivals Tell Congress, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020, 6:23 PM), https://www.politico.com
/news/2020/01/17/big-tech-competition-investigation-100701 [https://perma.cc/6KJZQ8W3].
85 See, e.g., Stephen Key, In Today’s Market, Do Patents Even Matter?, FORBES (Nov. 13,
2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2017/11/13/in-todays-market
-do-patents-even-matter/?sh=749960f956f3 [https://perma.cc/8FQ5-ABFT] (“[Small
businesses] need a point of a difference and a competitive edge. . . . Preventing copycats
and others from working around you is difficult with or without a patent.”).
86 See Maritain, supra note 54, at 104.
87 The analogy breaks down a bit, of course, because inventions are not discoveries;
they are created.
88 See StartUp, supra note 76.
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protection, it may be reasonably assumed that by disclosing the
invention publicly at a trade show, he was donating it to society.89 Any
assumption otherwise would provide administrability issues, which do
not necessarily negate natural law obligations.90
III.

“HUMAN INTERVENTION” AND NATURAL LAW

A. Property Rights and Patents at the U.S. Supreme Court
Having concluded that there is a reasonable natural law basis for
patents, the next question is how this affects (or should affect) current
patent law jurisprudence. The answer is that a reemphasis on the
natural law for patents may result in the restrengthening private
property rights in inventions that have been increasingly viewed with
skepticism by the Supreme Court.
In 2017, the Supreme Court stated in Oil States Energy Services, LLC
v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC that “patents are ‘public franchises’ that
the Government grants ‘to the inventors of new and useful
improvements.’”91 According to Professor MacLeod, the Court’s
decision in Oil States emphasized that patents exhibit three different
categories depending on context:
(1) rights that the public as a whole enjoys not to be defrauded by
an ill-gotten patent or otherwise wronged; (2) rights generated by
positive laws that are not primarily determined by natural rights but
are instead matters of indifference that lawmakers settle by their
choices; and (3) rights that are derived from prerogative grants,
such as franchises and letters patent.92

Consequently, “patents implicate private rights for some
interested parties and public rights for others.”93 Since patent rights
are not derived from common law,94 the Court stated in Oil States, the
rights must be derived from statute.95 An emphasis of these public
89 See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Unique
Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (highlighting the “wellestablished rule that ‘subject matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is
dedicated to the public’”).
90 See Maritain, supra note 54, at 105 (“[W]hat we are now seeking is the general
foundation of property right . . . and not those special conditions with which separate
individuals must comply in order to become lawful owners.”).
91 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373
(2018) (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533 (1871)).
92 MacLeod, supra note 44, at 1284.
93 See id. at 1286.
94 A correct statement yet asterisked in Part I above. See supra Part I.
95 See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374.
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rights by the Court is a step away from any natural law principles that
may have previously existed in patent law.96 By conflating administration of patent rights with the grant of a right, the Court effectively
undermines any basis with which morality (i.e., the natural law and the
benefit of the common good) can play into exclusivity to inventions.
Though this approach affects many aspects of patent law, technology
inventors have significantly felt the impact of the approach in the
Court’s treatment of “subject matter eligibility.”97
B. The Current State of Subject Matter Eligibility
Subject matter eligibility, or the kinds of inventions that can be
patentable, are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101. The section reads:
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”98 Though at first blush the
statute appears clear in delimiting a patentable invention as a “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” the boundaries of
these concepts have proven far from that in the judiciary. For example,
does a biological organism created in a lab constitute a manufacture?
In 1980, the Supreme Court said yes.99 Does an application of the
mathematical principles of Hooke’s Law constitute a process? The
Federal Circuit has said no.100
The Supreme Court has classified certain judicial exceptions to
subject matter eligibility, barring the patenting of “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”101 These exceptions attempt
to combat a concern for the preemption of general concepts, available
to all, that may play a role in the any inventor’s creative process.102
From a policy perspective, we should not want to award a patent for
96 See generally MacLeod, supra note 44, at 1305, 1317 (describing the public rights
addressed in Oil States as, in part, confused with “[a] privilege that is indifferent as a matter
of reason or ancient custom and is instead settled or specified by positive law”).
97 See OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., ADJUSTING TO
ALICE: USPTO PATENT EXAMINATION OUTCOMES AFTER ALICE CORP. V. CLS BANK
INTERNATIONAL (2020) [hereinafter OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST].
98 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
99 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (“[The] discovery is not
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter . . . .”).
100 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
modified after reh’g denied, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W.
3233 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2020) (No. 20-891).
101 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)).
102 See id.

2184

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

things that are generally available and were not actually invented. With
this concept in mind, courts have struggled to determine whether
computerized technology fits into one of these judicial exceptions.103
Is software an invention analogous to a machine? Or is it merely a
series of logical steps, like mathematics, which constitute an abstract
idea?104
The Court’s answer to the question of computer-based subject
matter eligibility in Alice kicked off a period of uncertainty as to the
future of software patents.105 In Alice, the Court held that a bank’s
patent directed to settlement mitigation via a computer, was nothing
more than an abstract idea.106 The Court stated that “[t]here is no
dispute that . . . many computer-implemented claims are formally
addressed to patent-eligible subject matter.”107 However, the test for
subject matter eligibility established in the case108 created a hurdle to
patentability that proved difficult for many technology inventors to
overcome.109 Since that decision, the Court has not heard another case
on subject matter eligibility.110
In the years following, though, the Federal Circuit has developed
its jurisprudence within the Alice two-step framework in a way that has
carved roads to eligibility for some computer-based inventions. This
expanded jurisprudence is not always consistent, however. The
Federal Circuit’s Section 101 jurisprudence has been described as
103 See generally Adam Mossoff, A Brief History of Software Patents (and Why They’re Valid),
56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYLLABUS 65, 70–72 (2014) (positing that arguing patents on software
should be treated like patents on mathematical algorithms is “sophistry”).
104 Contra id. at 66–69.
105 See, e.g., Gregory A. Castanias, David M. Maiorana & Matthew W. Johnson, Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank: Did the Supreme Court Sign the Warrant for the “Death of Hundreds of
Thousands of Patents”?, JONES DAY (June 2014), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights
/2014/06/ialice-corp-v-cls-banki-did-the-supreme-court-sign-the-warrant-for-the-death-ofhundreds-of-thousands-of-patents [https://perma.cc/AJZ5-FDL6] (“Is this the End of
Software Patents? . . . [I]t is unlikely . . . .”).
106 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 220 (2014) (“[I]ntermediated
settlement . . . is an ‘abstract idea’ beyond the scope of § 101.”).
107 Id. at 224.
108 The Alice “two-step” framework requires “determin[ing] whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” id. at 218, then “determin[ing] whether [the
claim] contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea
into a patent-eligible application,” id. at 221 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 80 (2012)).
109 This effect can be seen at both the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in
examination and in litigation. See OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST supra note 97.
110 See Thomas A. Miller, USTPO Launches Deferred Approach to Section 101 Eligibility
Analysis in Patent Prosecution, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/uspto-launches-deferred-approach-to-section-101-eligibility-analysis-patent
[https://perma.cc/GK2Z-4U8S].
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“worse than a circuit split.”111 In one school of thought, the language
from Alice (“improve the functioning of the computer itself. . . . Nor
do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field”)112 seems to provide a broad leeway for patenting software
technology as long as the software “improve[s] the functioning of the
computer itself.”113 In another school of thought, improving the
functioning of computers is a bar that is much more difficult to
overcome.114
Analogous controversy for natural phenomena arose at the
Federal Circuit in American Axle, discussed above, where the court held
that claim directed to an application of Hooke’s Law was patent
ineligible for being directed to a natural law.115 On petition for
rehearing, the Circuit split evenly and denied the request.116 The court
issued a modified opinion with additional reasoning for its Section 101
holding.117 In (now Chief) Judge Moore’s dissent, she discussed the
majority’s “result-oriented judicial activism” by “inflat[ing] § 101
beyond the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent” while
also raising procedural concerns of “deprivation of property rights
without due process.”118 She later wrote, “What we have here is worse
than a circuit split—it is a court bitterly divided. As the nation’s lone
patent court, we are at a loss as to how to uniformly apply § 101.”119
This equivalent (or as close as possible) to a circuit split on applying

111 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 977 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (Moore, J., concurring in denial of the motion to stay).
112 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
113 See, e.g., Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358–59 (2014)) (holding a
patented self-referential table to be patent eligible, since the court was “not persuaded that
the invention’s ability to run on a general-purpose computer dooms the claims”).
114 See, e.g., Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340–42 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359) (holding that the patented systems and methods
for editing XML documents to be patent ineligible for reciting the abstract idea of
“collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” itself without significantly more, since they
“neither improve the functions of the computer itself, nor provide specific programming,
tailored software, or meaningful guidance for implementing the abstract concept”).
115 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 939 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
modified after reh’g denied, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, 89 U.S.L.W.
3233 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2020) (No. 20-891).
116 See Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 966 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(denying rehearing en banc).
117 See Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (modifying its initial opinion on denial of rehearing).
118 Id. at 1304–05 (Moore, J., dissenting).
119 Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 977 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (Moore, J., concurring in denial of the motion to stay).
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Section 101 stretches beyond natural phenomena and into each of the
judicial exceptions, including abstract ideas, as identified above.
Many have already noted the intertwining of other patentability
bars with Section 101, including the nonobviousness requirement
under § 103.120 Likewise, Judge Moore’s dissent in American Axle
charges the majority with intertwining the gatekeeping requirements
with § 112.121 These splits in approaches to subject matter eligibility—
particularly with respect to abstract ideas and computer technology—
reflect a deemphasis on the property rights inherent in invention. It
appears that such a split is rooted at least somewhat in a differing view
on the purpose of subject matter eligibility standards and invention as
a whole. No clearer can this be seen than in Alice itself. Alice prescribes
a focus on an “inventive concept” and an improvement to computer
technology.122 These questions target the ability of the patent system
to promote the development of technology. In other words, the Court
is considering first that the aim of the patent system is to be an engine
of innovation. Then, it asks: how much would granting this patent
impede that aim? The problem with that approach, however, is that
the analysis is too narrow in its view of the goals of the patent system.
If one takes a view of the patent system as purely a government-granted
monopoly to promote innovation, then perhaps this inquiry makes
sense. However, when viewed through the lens of natural law, subject
matter eligibility necessarily widens.
C. Improving Subject Matter Eligibility through Natural Law Principles
The subject matter eligibility question is intended to assess
whether the disclosure presented to the Patent Office describes a
category of technology that is per se not an invention and is therefore
barred from patentability.123 Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas are all things that fall outside this test—they are not

120 See, e.g., Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s
Fantastic Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 10
(2015).
121 Am. Axle, 967 F.3d at 1305 (Moore, J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s “blended
101/112 analysis” “enablement on steroids”).
122 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 225–26 (2014).
123 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (describing “[t]he laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” as “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none”). In Chakrabarty, the rationale in describing subject
matter eligibility this way appears to be grounded on a belief that these categories of
invention are excluded primarily because they are discoveries that are inherent in nature—
they are not inventions.
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inventions. Applying common good language to these exclusions, we
would say that the “inventor” is not actually providing anything to the
common good, because there has been no contribution by the
individual that is deserving of private property protection. The
conflation of noninvention with categorical exclusion is seen by
comparing the eligibility analyses in Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.124 with Mayo. In Myriad, the Court exclaimed,
“Myriad did not create anything. . . . [This] is not an act of
invention.”125 In other words, the Court was saying that the reason for
having a “law of nature exception” was because there was nothing
inventive about a law of nature in and of itself.126 In Mayo, however,
the Court asked whether “the patent claims add enough . . . to allow the
processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply
natural laws.”127 Here, the language instead implies two separate
inquires: (1) what is the invention? and (2) how far away from the
judicial exception is it? This essentially became the framework for the
Alice two-step inquiry.128 No longer were the judicial exceptions
shorthand for per se lack of invention. Instead, an individual can now
invent something, but if the invention is so close to the judicial
exception, it fails to be eligible for exclusive property rights.
This approach is not aligned with a natural law understanding of
private property. Recall that a Maritain-based rationale for patent law
property rights is that patents are the tools by which one conducts his
business.129 A person is justified in holding the private property of an
invention if he is using the invention to benefit the common good.130
If this concept of private property is extended to patents, then the
inquiry should be different from Court’s current analysis. Whether or
not one may obtain a patent should instead be construed, in part,
through the lens of whether the invention is benefitting the common
good. If the invention does have the potential for benefitting the
common good, then it is presumptively patent eligible. If it has a
neutral or negative effect, then it is not.

124 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
125 Id. at 591.
126 See id.
127 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012).
128 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 218, 221 (2014) (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72, 80) (“We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept. . . . At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim
to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”).
129 See supra text accompanying notes 57–72.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 57–62.

2188

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:5

Similarly, an analysis through John Finnis’s framework yields a
similar result. Finnis differentiated between subject matter not created
by anybody and subject matter arising out of the willingness of
individuals to collaborate to improve their position.131 While Finnis’s
term “subject-matter” 132 was not used in the same manner as “subject
matter eligibility” for patent law, the two uses still have parallels. Finnis
listed examples of subject matter not created by anybody as including
solar energy and light, and he listed examples of subject matter arising
out of collaboration as including weapons or a drainage system.133 The
first category is strikingly similar to the judicial exceptions barring laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. However, unlike
the judicial exceptions, Finnis’s focus on lack of creation is much more
generalized than the specific categories of judicial exceptions.
The judicial exceptions are, in reality, species of the kinds of
property that Finnis identifies. Whereas Finnis states that the subject
matter not created by anybody (as a whole) is “common stock,”134 the
judicial exceptions instead identify three such subcategories that
would fall under Finnis’s common stock. It does appear that Finnis’s
concern is a similar one to that of the Supreme Court, however. Both
Finnis and the Court attempt to address an unjust division of resources:
Finnis is concerned with the coopting of all resources that would be to
the detriment of the good of individuals in society.135 The Court is
concerned with the “monopolization of . . . tools” that would “impede
innovation.”136 The Supreme Court’s approach, however, fails to justly
address this concern. By focusing on specific examples of ineligible
concepts instead of the concepts themselves, the Court is actually
taking steps away from natural law and is consequently reducing the
strength of patent rights.
The current state of subject matter eligibility highlights this
expanding distance between any natural law basis for patentability of
inventions. Whereas previously advocates found it advantageous to
argue that an “[i]nvention, as a right of property, . . . is more like
acquisitions by the original right of nature,”137 such an argument
would have almost no weight under the current subject matter
eligibility standard. Previously, the inquiry was based on whether one
had invented something at all; now the test is whether or not one has
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

See FINNIS, supra note 67, at 167.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 168.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
WEBSTER, supra note 48, at 2.
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invented something that is within a judicial exception. Because of this
extra hurdle, the test is underinclusive. Many software products that
are contributing some good to society are not eligible for patent
protection not because they are not inventions but because they have
not “add[ed] enough” to be far away from a per se exclusionary
category.138 Instead, these are more like Finnis’s second category of
property: subject matter arising out of the collaboration of individuals.
As Finnis identifies, his concepts have “implications in many fields of
activity, not least in . . . economic activity.”139 And this is precisely
where inventions sit—patents are tools of a craft that, like Maritain
claims, are part of the “vocation of human nature to elaborate raw
material according to a rational design.”140 When inventions such as
computer programs are used by a business to benefit the common
good, they thus warrant private property protection. The current test
for patent eligibility steps away from the this right by requiring a
comparison not to what is “common stock,” or things that are available
to all. Instead, it asks how deserving something is of patentability
compared to a single species within that “common stock.”
In other words, asking whether a technology is similar to a species
of patent ineligible concepts (instead of asking whether the technology
benefits the common good) effectively jettisons the idea of justice
inherent in the efficient distribution of private property—and further
removes the duty to benefit society with this technology. The current
precedent changes the focus to an inventor’s impedance or promotion
of economic progress. Not only is this short sighted, but it is what § 102
and § 103 are already geared to address through anticipation and
obviousness hurdles.141 The purpose of Section 101 should be to
merely provide a gateway question: is this an invention? If so, it is
patent eligible. Recognizing a natural law basis for granting these
patents provides the most effective means by which to judge whether
something should be patent eligible. The “engine of innovation”
concern expressed by the Court is inevitably tied up into preemption.
But preemption is not the question we should be asking. Instead, it
should be, “is this technology contributing to the common good?” If
so, it is meeting the goals of patenting. Therefore, it should be patent
eligible.

138
139
140
141

See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.
FINNIS, supra note 67, at 169.
Maritain, supra note 54, at 105.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2018).
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D. A Legislative Solution
At the time of writing this Note, a petition for certiorari has been
filed in American Axle.142 The Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor
General to weigh in on the government’s opinion.143 Though the
ultimate decision in American Axle may change Section 101 jurisprudence, I believe the legislature is the appropriate place to refocus
patent law on both eligibility and the natural law. Both Congress and
some voices at the Federal Circuit have indicated that any change to
Section 101 should come from Congress.144
Luckily, senators have begun to lay the groundwork for such
changes. In 2019, Senators Tillis and Coons published a press release
outlining proposed changes to subject matter eligibility law.145 The
proposal included many changes to Section 101, including explicit
removal of the judicially defined exceptions.146 Additionally, one
seemingly modest change includes amending 35 U.S.C. § 100 to read:
“The term ‘useful’ means any invention or discovery that provides
specific and practical utility in any field of technology through human
intervention.”147 This change is notable for a couple reasons.
First, it is curious that in a proposal to adjust subject matter
eligibility, the senators felt the need to adjust the definition of “utility,”
a separate provision of § 100.148 Utility is a separate inquiry from
subject matter eligibility, which the rest of the proposal was directed

142 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
89 U.S.L.W. 3233 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2020) (No. 20-891).
143 See Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 141 S. Ct. 2594 (2021) (mem.).
144 For Congress, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10344, JUDGES URGE CONGRESS TO
REVISE WHAT CAN BE PATENTED 4 (2020) (stating that due to the similarity of facts between
Athena and Mayo, “Congress may be the central avenue for revisions to section 101.”), and
for the Federal Circuit, see Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927
F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Lourie, J., concurring with denial of rehearing en banc)
(“Accordingly, as long as the Court’s precedent stands, the only possible solution lies in the
pens of claim drafters or legislators.”) and id. at 1363 (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“While we believe that such claims should be eligible for patent
protection, the majority of this court has definitively concluded that the Supreme Court
prevents us from so holding. No need to waste resources with additional en banc requests.
Your only hope lies with the Supreme Court or Congress. I hope that they recognize the
importance of these technologies, the benefits to society, and the market incentives for
American business. And, oh yes, that the statute clearly permits the eligibility of such
inventions and that no judicially-created exception should have such a vast embrace. It is
neither a good idea, nor warranted by the statute.”).
145 See THOM TILLIS: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C., supra note 1.
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2018).
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to.149 My guess, however, is that drafters intended to focus on subject
matter eligibility and not utility.150 Such an approach is consistent with
the goals of the proposed legislation as a whole. Representative
Johnson, commenting on his work with the proposed legislation,
states, “Section 101 of the Patent Act is foundational to the patent
system, but recent court cases have upset what should be solid
ground.”151 Based on this stated purpose, it’s likely that the intent was
to address subject matter eligibility.
Second, the adoption of a “human intervention” standard paves
the way for a recognition of natural law principles in patent law. The
concept of human intervention is not completely unknown in patent
case law. In essence, this is what the Supreme Court appeared to be
striving for in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.152 By requiring that the new
bacterium have “markedly different characteristics from any found in
nature,” the Court was implying that nonnatural characteristics would
come from human intervention.153 This question makes sense when
considering an inventor-centric patent system. Essentially, the inquiry
is whether something was invented at all.
In subsequent subject matter eligibility cases, however, the Court
applied various other rationales. In Mayo, for example, the Court
stated that to qualify as patent eligible subject matter, an invention
must include an “inventive concept” in order to avoid monopolies on
laws of nature.154 The next term, the Court held in Myriad that “Myriad
did not create anything,” but the term “inventive concept” did not
appear once.155 And in Alice, the Court brought “inventive concept”
back with vigor to abstract ideas and other judicial exceptions.156 This
“inventive concept” framing, though, shifts the focus away from the
inventor and instead to the public: no longer is the Court determining
whether a human has labored to produce something valuable to the

149 See THOM TILLIS: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C., supra note 1.
150 This isn’t a unique misapplication of utility instead of subject matter eligibility. See
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353,
1364 n.60 (2010) (“The requirement of utility is often traced to § 101. Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966). Utility, however, is considered distinct from subject matter.”)
151 See THOM TILLIS: U.S. SENATOR FOR N.C., supra note 1.
152 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
153 See id. at 310 (“[The] discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly
it is patentable subject matter . . . .”); see also Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Antitrusting of
Patentability, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 71, 90 (2017) (arguing that by requiring “the potential
for significant utility,” the Chakrabarty Court “was satisfied that the invention’s utility arose
primarily from human intervention”).
154 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012).
155 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013).
156 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 222 (2014).
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common good. The analysis in Myriad was not far from a proper
analysis of invention. Ignoring any potential obviousness issues, if
something did exist in nature, it is not the product of human
intervention and therefore cannot result in patent eligible subject
matter.
This proposal by the legislature to adopt a “human intervention”
standard returns the assessment of subject matter eligibility into an
inventor-centric inquiry and significantly eases the challenge of
deciding which computer-implemented inventions are, in fact, not
inventions at all. As indicated above, many computer-based inventions
are invalidated under Section 101 as being directed toward abstract
ideas.157 This can result in significant ambiguity as to why certain
computer technology (especially software) is an improvement, while
others are not.158 Applying a “human intervention” standard to a
computer technology eligibility analysis demarcates a much clearer
line between technology that is an invention and those that are not.
Because of its inventor-centric approach, the analysis also returns the
patent system to one that is more closely grounded in line with the
natural law.
I propose that the principle governing the eligibility of software
inventions should be: “Is the software a but-for product of human
intervention, or did it exist before humans intervened?” The
administrability of such a line can be seen when reapplied to past cases.
For example, a self-referential table does not exist but-for the human
intervention.159 For inventions addressing living organisms, this may
work as well: lab-created microorganisms, though alive, would not exist
but-for human intervention.160 Isolated DNA, on the other hand,
would not be patent eligible; yet lab-created complementary DNA
would be.161 No longer would courts have to muddle through whether
an invention is “significantly more” than a judicial exception and
participate in case-by-case fact comparisons to determine whether they
are too close to those concepts. Instead, the human-intervention rule
would provide a clean way to interpret what is an invention from what
is not an invention.

157
158
159
160
161

See supra text accompanying notes 105–14.
Id.
Cf. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Cf. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Cf. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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CONCLUSION
Though patent law in the United States is statutory, there is some
indication that the natural law played a role in the historical origins of
patent law. In adopting judicial exceptions to subject matter eligibility,
however, the Supreme Court has steered patent law jurisprudence
away from any potential natural law rationales and consequently
deemphasized patent property rights.
As discussed above,
implementing legislative changes to shift the focus of subject matter
eligibility to “human intervention” may rectify some of these problems.
Notably, there are two corollaries that come from adopting a
“human intervention” approach. First, such a test places much more
reliance on the other requirements of patentability (e.g., §§ 102, 103,
and 112) to ensure that exclusive rights in patent eligible inventions
have not, in fact, already been granted to another person or dedicated
to the public.162 Even though certain inventions should be patent
eligible, since they benefit the common good, they can still only be
given to one inventor or set of co-inventors.163 Ensuring a robust
anticipation and non-obviousness analysis further bolsters an
understanding that patent rights are property rights that can be held
only by those with a true ownership interest in the patent. Second, this
may require the adoption of additional changes to § 112’s enablement
requirements to ensure that future technology is not preempted.164 A
similar case to Morse’s famously-invalidated patent on attempting to
claim all communication via electro-magnetism, for example, may be
addressed through strict enablement requirements.165 How can one
preempt future technology if he has not invented it yet?
Focusing on human intervention would place patent law
jurisprudence more in line with the natural law. The question should
not be whether granting the patent would impede the progress of
technology—though that should be one of the ancillary benefits of
patent law. Instead, the question should be whether something was
invented at all. Is the invention a means of production that an inventor
is entitled to as an intellectual maker? Or does it lack the influence of
an intellectual maker, and is it therefore merely purely a common
162 Certain academics have identified that this balance is already broken. See, e.g.,
David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 158 (2016).
163 See Maritain, supra note 54, at 103.
164 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018).
165 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1854). But see Adam Mossoff,
O’Reilly v. Morse and Claiming a “Principle” in Antebellum Era Patent Law, 71 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 735, 737–38 (2020) (claiming the debate over the rationale for the invalidation of
Morse’s patent to be anachronistic, since there are significant differences in Antebellum
Era patent law and the settled legal practice in patent law was not followed).
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resource? Such an approach would improve the patent system’s
administrability and boost inventors’ confidence in their ability to
secure rights to their inventions. And in this way, it would contribute
to the common good.

